Mitt Romney est le Rodney Dangerfield de la politique américaine. Après avoir remporté six des dix États du «Super mardi» et engrangé la majorité des délégués mis en jeu*, il pourrait reprendre à son compte le monologue du défunt comédien : «Aucun respect, aucun respect, c'est l'histoire de ma vie... I get no respect.»
L'ancien gouverneur du Massachusetts a certes confirmé hier son statut de favori pour affronter Barack Obama. Mais il est considéré par la plupart des analystes comme un favori meurtri, dont le virage périlleux à droite et l'avalanche de publicités négatives ne lui ont pas permis d'éteindre des candidats aussi faibles que Rick Santorum et Newt Gingrich.
Permettez-moi de citer dans le texte quelques-uns de ces analystes en soulignant que leur opinion rejoint largement celle exprimée dans ce texte par mon collègue de La Presse Alexandre Sirois.
Jeff Zeleny, du New York Times :
Mitt Romney won the delegates, but not necessarily the argument.
His quest to win the Republican presidential nomination has always resembled a detailed, methodical business plan. Mr. Romney, who spent much of his life fixing troubled corporations, must now decide whether steps are necessary to repair his lethargic candidacy.
Dan Balz, du Washington Post :
Nomination battles often strengthen the winner, but some take a toll. Rarely is there a straight line between March and November that predicts the outcome of a general election. Still, Romney is in worse shape at this point in the campaign than virtually all recent previous nominees.
Demographically, his image among independent voters, the most critical swing group, is more negative now than it was when the primary battle began. He could be hurt among women. He is in trouble with Latinos, a growing part of the electorate that is tilting even more Democratic than it was four years ago. He is not as strong as he needs to be among working-class white voters, among whom President Obama has been consistently weak.
Many political analysts compare 2012's Republican Presidential cycle to the Democrats' go of it in 2008. Barack Obama deployed a delegate strategy while Hillary Clinton went for big state wins. It worked to Barack Obama's favor. This year, it works for Romney. (...)
The big difference between 2008 and 2012 is that in 2008, David beat Goliath. The base of the party rallied to the David who took out the machine no one thought could be taken out. In 2012, Goliath is beating David and no one ever really cheers for Goliath.
Karl Rove, at least, still has his back. As midnight came around and Romney's vote tally in Ohio finally edged ahead of Santorum's, the Republican svengali said on Fox News, "A win is a win is a win." That, certainly, is true. But this was a win in which Romney outspent Santorum by five or six to one, and in which his campaign machine rolled out everybody from Donald Trump to Eric Cantor to carry him over the finish line.
George Seib, du Wall Streeet Journal :
Still, the outcome also pointed to Romney weaknesses that haven't gone away. He hasn't dispelled concern about his strength in the South. The outcome in Tennessee, in particular, suggested that religious conservatives can't all get entirely comfortable with him-and that his Mormon faith may still be a quiet issue for some of them.
He still hasn't won over tea-party activists, despite the fact that Rep. Eric Cantor, the No. 2 House Republican and the man who works best with the tea-party contingent in the House, endorsed him on the eve of Super Tuesday. And now the campaign moves into some terrain-Kansas, Mississippi and Alabama-that isn't necessarily overly friendly to him.
* La course aux délégués après les scrutins du «Super mardi», qui mettaient en jeu 437 des 1 144 délégués nécessaires pour décrocher l'investiture républicaine :
Romney : 415 délégués
Santorum :176
Gingrich :105
Paul : 47